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Abstract
Data on the growth performances of countries with similar comparative (dis)advantage and
political institutions reveal a striking variation across world regions. While some former autoc-
racies such as the East Asian growth miracles have done remarkably well, others such as the
Latin American economies have grown at much lower rates. In this paper, we propose a politi-
cal economy explanation of these diverging paths of development by addressing the preferences
of the country￿ s political elite. We build a theoretical framework where factors of production
owned by the political elites di⁄er across countries. In each country, the incumbent autocrat will
cater to the preferences of the elites when setting trade policy and the property rights regime.
We show how stronger property rights may lead to capital accumulation and labor reallocation
to the manufacturing sector. This, in turn, can lead to a shift in the comparative advantage, a
decision to open up to trade and an in￿ ow of more productive foreign capital. Consistent with
a set of stylised facts on East Asia and Latin America, we argue that strong property rights are
crucial for success upon globalization.
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11 Introduction
Data from the post World-War II era of globalisation reveal a striking variation in the growth per-
formances of autocratic countries. Globalisation, it seems, has proved a successful growth strategy
in some regions such as East Asia, but not in others, such as Latin America. While countries in
both regions were non-democratic at the start of the post-war period, historical accounts suggest
that East Asian autocracies di⁄ered from those in Latin America in that the political elites were
capitalists in the former and land owners in the latter.1 The entrenched in￿ uence of the elites
is one explanation for the widely divergent policies implemented in the two regions. Drawing on
existing hypotheses, historical data, stylised facts and empirical evidence, this paper puts forth a
political economy model of a small, potentially open economy to explain how two similar economies
that only di⁄er with respect to the preferences of the political elite may embark on dramatically
diverging growth paths.
We use a speci￿c factors trade model characterised by the principles of comparative advantage
to replicate a series of historical events and key stylised facts in Latin America and East Asia
comprising the protection of property rights, trade liberalisation, the in￿ ow of foreign capital,
reallocation of labour to the manufacturing sector and the evolution of income.2 The incumbent
autocrat sets the trade regime and chooses whether or not to enforce property rights, thereby
a⁄ecting the local investment climate and the ability to attract foreign investors. Despite several
common traits and similar economic structures in the two regions, openness to trade appears to
have been bene￿cial in the former but detrimental in the latter for growth.3 We relate this to the
appropriability argument, and argue that the success of an infant industry hinges on the existence of
strong property rights that promote investment.4 Our results suggest that comparative advantage
and property rights interact in important ways and are crucial to long-run development and growth.
Moreover, when it comes to trade liberalization as a growth strategy, timing appears to be key.
The analysis explains why many landed economies, notably those of Latin America, chose to
open up to trade at an early stage of development and how this strategy led to to weak property
1 See Glaeser et al. (2004) and Falkinger and Grossman (2005) for some historical examples. The idea that
autocrats may be heterogenous has been highlighted in Shen (2007) and Paltseva (2008) who distinguish between
good and bad dictators. Larsson and Parente (2010) also introduce an autocrat with preferences in line with those
of the political elite.
2 Seminal papers on the speci￿c factors model are Jones (1971), Samuelson (1971), Mussa (1974) and Neary
(1978).
3 Export-led growth is often credited as a key factor behind the East Asian success, see for instance Krueger
(1985) and World Bank (1993).
4 This feature is consistent with Nelson and Pack (1999), who identify entrepreneurship, innovation and learning
as key factors that must accompany investments in order to achieve the desired long-run economic outcome.
2rights, the alienation of foreign investors and economic stagnation. The intuition is as follows.
Since the Latin American landed elite of the 20th century owned the abundant factor, they were in
favour of an open economy. In autarky, the value of agricultural products is increasing in property
rights and all interest groups in society favour strong institutions. However, in an open economy,
prices are determined in the world market which triggers a domestic battle for labour. Under free
trade, land owners will ￿nd labour more expensive when property rights are enforced since this will
enable capitalists to pay higher wages. This disincentive results in weak property rights in an open
economy governed by a landed autocrat, and explains why returns to capital remained low in Latin
America, accounting for the region￿ s inability to accumulate capital, promote its manufacturing
sector, and catch up with the world market.5 The mechanism could also help explain the failure
of subsequent attempts to industrialise through infant-industry protection and import substitution
following a history of weak property rights and an underdeveloped manufacturing sector.
The model also provides a rationale for why the capitalist-oriented East Asian economies chose
to remain in autarky up to a point where they had accumulated su¢ ciently strong property rights
and illustrates how this timely strategy triggered rapid capital accumulation, the in￿ ow of pro-
ductive foreign capital, and economic growth. With a comparative disadvantage in capital, the
East Asian capitalists protected their economy and initially remained closed to the world market.
Meanwhile, they favoured strong property rights, which spurred investments in new technologies
and created high returns to capital. Such investments along with the in￿ ow of new, e¢ cient, capital
from abroad set the necessary grounds for the growth of the infant industry in these economies. Sub-
sequently, their manufacturing sector became competitive by world-market standards and gained
the capacity to bene￿t from trade liberalisation. Policies adopted by the capitalist-oriented auto-
crats of East Asia thus shifted the comparative advantage towards manufacturing over time and
were imperative for their economic success.
History and Literature
At the beginning of the 20th century, most Latin American countries were considered relatively
open to trade and specialised in exports of food and raw materials. The existence of attractive
external markets for the region￿ s primary exports bene￿ted the landed elite. The ruling autocrats,
who typically catered to the needs of the landowners, were therefore reluctant to implement policies
conducive to industrialisation. In some countries, such as Brazil, European powers had enough
5 Di⁄erently, Cervellati et al. (2011) show in a theoretical and empirical analysis how globalisation hampers the
adoption of new, more productive technologies in autocratic countries.
3leverage to force governments to allow for free trade. However, Latin America did not develop
the entrepreneurial class, the infrastructure, the market size, the administrative capacity or the
labour force necessary to cope with an extensive industrialisation process. The infant industries of
Latin America refused to grow up despite repeated attempts to protect them by means of import
substitution (Werner, 1972).
A large share of the previous studies attempting to explain the stagnation of Latin America
identify the concentration of land ownership as a possible culprit. Engerman and Sokolo⁄ (2000)
for instance contrast the economic development in Latin America to that of the US. They argue
that Latin America lagged behind as a result of extreme inequality in land ownership enabling the
elite to enforce their self interests, an idea which is also present in Persson and Tabellini (1994).
A related mechanism is emphasised in Galiani et al. (2008), who study investments in public edu-
cation in land-abundant economies governed by landlords who do not engage in the production of
manufacturing goods. They argue that such economies fail to sustain strong educational institu-
tions since the elites do not bene￿t from more educated workers. On a similar note, Galor et al.
(2009) show that inequality in land ownership may be detrimental to the emergence of institutions
promoting human capital and may therefore delay industrialisation. Adamopoulos (2008) further
relates policies that put barriers to capital accumulation or productivity to the landed elites lobby-
ing to protect their rents in the rural economy when the distribution of land ownership is su¢ ciently
concentrated.
History reveals that the East Asian economies pursued a di⁄erent strategy. Although many of
the economies in the region maintained trade barriers in terms of tari⁄s, they focused on promoting
investment in the manufacturing industry by encouraging the adoption of new technologies. To
this end, the East Asian economies invested heavily in R&D and programs aimed at promoting
technology adoption and human capital accumulation. Domestic industries were, to some extent,
protected from foreign competition, which helped them grow and compete. These policies led to
rapid capital accumulation, an in￿ ow of foreign capital and labour migration to the manufacturing
sector which gradually shifted the comparative advantage of the region towards manufacturing.
This shift in comparative advantage made openness to trade consistent with the preferences of the
in￿ uential capitalists, thereby rendering the ruling autocrats increasingly pro-trade.6 The trade
6 Many of the growth miracle countries, who have doubled their income in a decade or less, were autocratic when
the miracles began. Out of the ￿ve fastest growing countries 1950-2004 four were autocratic when their miracles
began (Larsson and Parente, 2010). Out of this set, which comprises Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Botswana and
Thailand, Botswana was the only democratic country. The East Asian economies were all autocratic.
4liberalisation that followed has often been considered a turning point for the region as it paved the
way for the miraculous growth performances of the East Asian Tigers (Anderson, 1983).
Many scholars argue that the East Asian miracle may be attributed to a carefully coordinated
policy mix comprising government protection and export promotion. Rodrik (1994, 1996) argues
that in East Asia, government policies helped establish a sound investment climate by increasing
returns to capital, making investments attractive and increasing the demand for imported capital
goods.7 The notion that a capitalist autocrat may implement policies conducive to growth is
consistent also with Galor and Moav (2006) who argue that capitalists have incentives to invest in
upgrading the skills of the labour force as it raises the productivity of capital in the manufacturing
sector.
Finally, our work is clearly also related to the vast more general literature on institutions,
political regimes and economic performance, where important contributions include Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000, 2001, 2006, 2007) Acemoglu et al. (2008), Aghion et al. (2007), Glaeser et al.
(2004) and Persson and Tabellini (2009).8 The idea that vested interest groups, along the lines of
our political elites, may erect barriers to growth and development has been emphasised by Olson
(1982), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), and Parente and Prescott (2002).
Stylised Facts
Our work is inspired to replicate a set of stylised facts on the East Asian and Latin American
economies. The East Asian sample comprises Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and
Hong Kong. The Latin American sample includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.9
Figure 1 displays the revealed comparative advantage in the food and manufacturing sectors
and the shares of exports produced in these two sectors over he period 1960-1978.10 Comparing the
two top panels, the graphs indicate that Latin America held a comparative advantage in food while
East Asia held a comparative advantage in manufacturing relative to the other set of countries in
7 See also Stiglitz (1996).
8 See for instance Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Persson and Tabellini (2009) for overviews.
9 This sample include all Latin American economies for which data was available and the Newly Industrialised
Countries in East Asia plus Malaysia and Thailand. We include the latter two to reinforce our point even if they
have not experienced the extraordinary growth of the four Asian Tigers. In our context, these countries have also
established a noteworthy move towards manufacturing and sound growth even if they have retained strong comparative
advantage in food. On the contrary, Indonesia and Philippines (not included) has followed a di⁄erent path as their
comparative advantage lies on natural resources and food respectively.
10 Source: elaborated by the authors with data s from Anderson (1983) Table 3.
5Figure 1: Comparative advantage in East Asia and Latin America. East Asia: Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong. Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela
this period.11 The revealed comparative advantage is re￿ ected in the bottom two panels depicting
export shares of the two categories. The plots suggest that Latin America consistently had a
higher share of food exports than East Asia, while the reverse holds true for manufacturing. The
plots also suggest that, over time, the revealed comparative advantage and the share of exports in
manufacturing increases remarkably more in East Asia than in Latin America.
Figure 2 displays the labour share in the industry, a property rights index and net capital in￿ ows
for both regions.12 The top panel indicates that there was a gradual shift in labour towards the
manufacturing sector from 1960 onwards in East Asia. This sectoral shift is much less pronounced
for Latin America. The middle panel displays the average property rights index for the two re-
11 Evidence suggests that East Asia, especially the four Asian Newly Industrialised Countries have experienced
sharp increases in their comparative disadvantages in food vis-a-vis manufacturing.
12 The plots are based on data from Anderson (1983) Table 2, Fraser Institute Economic Freedom World Index,
and World Development Indicators respectively.
6Figure 2: Labour ￿ ows, property rights and capital in￿ ow in East Asia and Latin America
gions.13 The graph suggests that property rights were consistently stronger in East Asia than in
Latin America. From the mid 1980s onwards, there is a sharp increase in the index for the Asian
economies. Finally, the bottom panel shows the surge in private capital ￿ ows towards East Asia in
the late 1970￿ s up to the early 1980￿ s.14
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 discusses
the equilibrium under di⁄erent trade regimes and Section 4 introduces international capital mobility.
Section 5 presents the political-economy layer of the model and derives analytical results on optimal
regimes and policies. Simulations are presented in Section 6. Discussion and concluding remarks
are given in Sections 7 and 8 respectively.
13 This is obtained from a sub-index Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, which is intended to capture
the security, protection, and enforcement of property rights.
14 Sample does not include Taiwan and Hong Kong due to the lack of data on FDI.
72 The Model
Consider a small, potentially open economy. The economy consists of two sectors denoted j = A;M
for agriculture and manufacturing. Each sector produces a sector-speci￿c good that is tradable in
the world market. There are three groups of households that di⁄er in their initial endowments and
supply either land, capital or labour to ￿rms. We assume that each time period, denoted t, is one
generation so that households and policy makers have one-period lives. A subgroup of households
have warm-glow preferences, bequeathing a share of their income to their children.15
The economy is ruled by an autocrat who may be capitalist or landed in nature.16 The autocrat
has the power to decide the level of property rights, whether to maintain a closed or open economy
and whether to allow for the in￿ ow of foreign capital.
The timing of the model is such that at the beginning of each period, the autocrat decides on
the regime and sets the level of property rights, taking into account how households and ￿rms are
going to respond. At the end of the period, everyone dies.
The model is solved by backward induction. In this section and in Sections 3 and 4, we therefore
treat economic policy and the economic regime as exogenously given and focus on the optimal
choices of households and ￿rms (below) and the regime-speci￿c equilibria (Sections 3 and 4). The
preferences and optimal choices of the policy makers are then analysed in detail in Section 5.
2.1 Firms
The agriculture and manufacturing sectors di⁄er in terms of technology and the factors employed
in production. Labour is the only input used in both technologies and is perfectly mobile across
the two sectors.
2.1.1 Agriculture
The agricultural sector uses land (X) and labour (L) to produce the agricultural good. Letting YA




15 The warm-glow preference structure enables us to characterise the equilibrium in each period. The bequests
ensure that there is a dynamic link between periods and that the capital stock is growing over time.
16 Modelling an autocracy rather than a democracy simpli￿es the political-economy layer of the model but without
loss of generality: our results would obtain also in a democracy where the political elites could form a political lobby
and exert pressure on the democratic leader. Persson and Tabellini (2002) build a model where the democratic leader
caters to the lobbying group.
8where ￿ 2 (0;1) and LAt denotes the labour employed in agriculture.
2.1.2 Manufacturing
The manufacturing sector uses capital (K) and labour to produce the agricultural good:
YMt = ￿t (AKtKDt + KFt)
￿ L1￿￿
Mt (2)
where KDt and KFt are domestic and foreign capital stocks, invested in the country we model. Note
that the presence of foreign capital is contingent on domestic returns to capital being su¢ ciently
high. This issue will be studied in detail in Section 4 but, for now, the level of foreign capital can
be treated as exogenous. LMt refers to the labour employed in manufacturing. The parameter AKt
denotes the productivity of domestic capital. We will later assume that AKt is a function of foreign
capital, i.e. a measure of the degree of spillovers generated by capital in￿ ows, but will maintain
the notation AKt for the time being.17
2.2 Households
There are three di⁄erent types of households, denoted h, in the economy. The three groups are
workers (L), capitalists (K) and landowners (X). Denote the number of workers, capitalists and
landowners by L;NK and NX; respectively. The total population at time t is denoted Nt =
Lt+NKt+NXt and is normalised to one. We assume a stationary population as population growth
is of no importance for the dynamics of interest in our setting.
2.2.1 Endowments
The three groups of households are endowed with only one of the three possible factor inputs in the
economy: labour, land or capital. Workers are endowed with one unit of time and supply labour
to ￿rms, landowners hold one unit of land which they rent to ￿rms in the agricultural sector and
capitalists rent their capital to ￿rms in the manufacturing sector.
The income of a worker in sector j is thus:
ILjt = wjt. (3)
where w denotes the wage.
17 Note that we assume that the relative weight of labour in the production function, 1 ￿ ￿, is the same in both
sectors. The assumption is made for simplicity and is of minor importance: sectoral di⁄erences in terms of labour￿ s
share in production are not related to the dynamics of interest in our model.
9The income of a capitalist is:
IKt = rDtkt (4)
where rDt denotes returns to domestic capital and kt ￿ KDt=NKt is the capital endowment of each
capitalist. The income of a landowner is:
IXt = rXt (5)
where rXt denotes returns to land.
2.2.2 Preferences
Households di⁄er with respect to their endowments, but also with respect to their preferences. We
assume that the utility functions of workers and landowners are linear in consumption:
Uht (Ct) = Ct;




We assume that the land endowment is passed to the children of landowners at the end of the
period.
Capitalists derive utility from consumption and from leaving bequests to their o⁄spring. Their
preferences are thereby characterised by a warm-glow utility and given by:
UKt (Ct;Bt) = C￿
t B1￿￿
t ;
where Bt is the total amount of bequests of the capitalist household. For simplicity, we assume
that bequests are produced using manufacturing goods.
2.2.3 Utility maximisation
Since workers and landowners have identical, linear utility functions these households simply con-
sume their entire income. The indirect utility of a worker household employed in sector j is
therefore:
VLjt = wjt. (6)
The indirect utility of a landowner is:
VXt = IXt. (7)













The indirect utility of a capitalist household is therefore:




where e ￿ = (￿￿)
￿￿ (￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
￿(1￿￿) (1 ￿ ￿)







There is full depreciation of capital in each period but capitalist households leave a share of their
income as bequests to their children in the form of an investment good, denoted Kt, where Kt =
Bt￿1. The investment good cannot be consumed but must be used for investment in capital.
3 Equilibrium under Di⁄erent Trade Regimes
This section solves for the equilibrium prices of goods, factor allocations, returns and output levels
in the two sectors under di⁄erent assumptions about the trade regime. We start by discussing
general equilibrium conditions in Section 3.1, and proceed by discussing the equilibria in a closed
and open economy, respectively in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.1 General
Regardless of the trade regime, under full employment and inelastic labour supply, employment in
the two sectors adds up to the total labour supply in the country:
Lt = LAt + LMt. (12)
Due to perfect competition between ￿rms, wages are equal to the marginal product of labour.
Moreover, labour can move freely between the two sectors, equalising the wage across sectors:







where we have take the price of manufacturing as the numØraire. PAt therefore denotes the relative
price of agricultural goods in terms of manufacturing goods.
113.2 Closed Economy







(wtLt + rXtXt + ￿rDtKDt); (14)
where the superindex C now denotes a closed economy.18 The RHS denotes the expenditure on
agriculture by workers, land owners and capitalists, respectively. Recall that capitalists spend a
share ￿ of their income on consumption (of which a share ￿ is spent on agricultural products).
The equivalent in the manufacturing sector is:
YCMt = (1 ￿ ￿)(wtLt + rXtXt + ￿rDtKDt) +
Used for bequests
z }| {
(1 ￿ ￿)rDtKDt (15)
where the second term on the RHS is the amount of manufacturing goods used for bequests.












Not surprisingly, agricultural goods are relatively more expensive if labour is relatively more pro-
ductive in manufacturing, property rights are strong and if land is scarce relative to capital.
The wage equality condition in equation (16) and the goods market equilibria in equations (14)














As is standard in the speci￿c factor model, in autarky, the relative labour allocation in the two
sectors is independent of factor endowments (except for the term AKtKDt
AKtKDt+KFt which comes from
the additional demand for manufacturing goods by capitalists leaving bequests to their children).
This is because prices adjust in proportion to labour productivity in the two sectors. The term ￿
1￿￿
denotes the relative demand for agricultural goods and is positively related to the share of labour
in agriculture. A lower ￿ indicates lower marginal returns to capital, and hence less resources to
spend on bequests. This lowers demand for manufacturing and therefore also LC
Mt. 1￿￿ denotes the
relative importance of bequests to capitalists. A higher value of (1 ￿ ￿) re￿ ects more expenditure
on bequests and therefore a higher demand for manufacturing goods and labour in that sector.
Finally, the term AKtKDt
AKtKDt+KFt captures the assumption that only domestic capital owners invest
18 We only index the variables that are regime-speci￿c in each period. Lt and KDt are history-dependent but they
are nevertheless given at the start of each period.
12in bequests. Therefore, the smaller the share of domestic capital in the economy, the lower the
in￿ uence of bequests on the relative allocation of labour. In other words, the more important role
foreign capital plays in the economy, the more workers will be employed in agriculture.











The returns to domestic capital and land are in turn given by the marginal product of these
factors. Using the de￿nition of output from (1) and (2), the relative price in (16), and the labour
allocation derived from (12) and (17), returns can be summarised in the following Lemma


























AKtKDt (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) + KFt
(AKtKDt (1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)) + KFt)
1￿￿.
The result suggests that the e⁄ect of foreign capital on the returns to domestic capital is
ambiguous. It enters directly into the denominator since more foreign capital lowers the marginal
productivity of domestic capital due to diminishing returns. However, it also enters the numerator
through its technological spillovers on domestic capital, here captured by its e⁄ect on AKt. The net
e⁄ect therefore depends on the exact nature of how foreign capital enters AKt. Moreover, a larger
labour stock increases the returns to both capital and land by increasing the productivity of both
factors in their speci￿c sectors. Capital a⁄ects the returns to land, but land does not a⁄ect returns
to capital. The reason for this is that more capital increases the relative price of agricultural goods,
whereas manufacturing goods are used as the numØraire.
The institutional quality captured by the property-rights parameter, ￿t, is important for the
return to both factors of production, but through separate channels. Property rights raise the
return to capital by a⁄ecting capital￿ s marginal productivity. Land returns are also increasing in
institutional quality (and with the same magnitude) but through an increase in the relative price
rather than the marginal productivity in physical units. Lastly, the ￿nal term in the expression for
returns to land highlights the role played by bequests and the fact that domestic capital owners
pay their bequests in manufacturing goods. If bequests did not matter (￿ = 1), this term would
simplify greatly, but as long as they do matter and ￿ 2 (0;1), land returns are higher with more
foreign capital since foreign capitalists do not give bequests.










AKtKDt (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) + KFt
(19)
which increases in the productivity of domestic capital and the relative scarcity of capital as com-
pared to land (the latter e⁄ect is captured by the relative factor endowments Xt
AKtKDt(1￿￿(1￿￿))+KFt).
The net e⁄ect of foreign capital, however, is determined by the nature of spillovers captured by
AKt. The relative demand for manufacturing goods, captured by the term (1￿￿)=￿; increases the
relative returns to capital owners. Land owners carry a higher relative return when bequests are
less important, i.e. when ￿ is high. Note also that property rights do not matter for relative returns
in autarky. This is because property rights simultaneously increase the productivity of capital,
which increases the return to capital, and the relative price of agricultural goods, which increases
the relative return to land. These two e⁄ects are of exactly the same magnitude and cancel out.
3.3 Open Economy
In an open economy, the relative price of agricultural goods to manufactures, PAt, is taken as
exogenous and set equal to the world relative price P￿
At. In an open economy, the relative labour
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At Xt + ￿
1
￿
t (AKtKDt + KFt)
.
Under free trade in goods, the allocation of labour between the two sectors does indeed react
to factor endowments. This is because prices do not change with factor endowments and cannot
counterbalance their e⁄ects as they do in autarky. The relative allocation of labour in manufacturing
increases with property rights, the capital stock and the productivity of labour in manufacturing.
It decreases with the relative price of agricultural goods and the endowment of land. Using this
information, we can conclude:
Lemma 2 In an open economy, an improvement in the property rights regime, accumulation of
domestic capital, and the entry of foreign capital all shift labour from agriculture to manufacturing.
14Using (20) along with (12), we can derive the returns to domestic capital and land in an open
economy:
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This Lemma provides some interesting insights which are all related to the allocation of labour
under free trade. First, capitalists bene￿t from an improvement in property rights (since this raises
their marginal productivity) while land owners do not (since this draws labour out of agriculture,
which decreases the productivity of land). Moreover, capitalists lose from a higher price of agricul-
tural goods while land owners gain. Finally, bequests do no longer play a role in the open economy
since prices are ￿xed by foreign rather than domestic supply and demand.
4 Introducing International Capital Mobility
We next introduce international capital mobility and allow for the possibility that foreign (more
productive) capital may ￿ ow into the country. We start by discussing the equilibrium implications
for the closed economy in Section 4.1 below and proceed with the open economy in Section 4.2.
4.1 Closed Economy
The level of foreign capital, KFt, is determined by the potential returns it will generate in the



















The opportunity cost for foreign capital owners is the exogenous world interest rate, r￿
t. There-






< 0, it is su¢ cient to examine whether the latent return to the ￿rst unit of foreign





















Ft is the latent return to foreign capital under autarky, and e AC
Kt the productivity of domestic
capital when there is no foreign capital in the country, i.e. the lower bound of AC
Kt. For simplicity,
we normalise e AC
Kt to unity. Here, we note that the probability of foreign capital owners wishing
to invest is increasing in property rights, the size of the labour force and the scarcity of domestic
capital since all these three factors increase the productivity of capital employed in the country




t, a stock of foreign capital, KC
Ft, will ￿ ow into the country until, in equilibrium,
rC
Ft has adjusted to the world interest rate, rC
Ft = r￿
t. We can state:
Lemma 4 In a closed economy where e rC
Ft > r￿
t, the equilibrium level of foreign capital in￿ow that
satis￿es the interest rate parity condition rC
Ft = r￿
































where the relative price PAt from (16) and the endogenous level of foreign capital from (23) have
been used. The in￿ow of foreign capital is encouraged by strong property rights and the scarcity of
domestic capital and land.
Note that if e rC
Ft ￿ r￿
t, returns are evaluated by replacing KFt = 0 in the respective factor
returns in Lemma 1.
The result suggests that foreign capital will ￿ ow to larger countries since, in such countries,
more capital is required for the returns to capital to comply with interest rate parity. Countries
with a more productive manufacturing labour force and with stronger property rights will also
attract more capital since the rate of return is higher in these countries. Countries with a large
capital stock of their own, however, are characterised by lower returns to capital and are therefore
less attractive to foreign investors.19
Lemma 1 also shows that foreign capital raises land returns through two channels: (i) it makes
land more scarce and therefore raises its price, and (ii) it makes bequests less important relative to
19This follows since ￿, (1 ￿ ￿) and ￿ are all less than unity.
16total output, thereby lowering the demand for manufacturing.20
4.2 Open Economy
In an open economy, returns to capital can be calculated in a similar manner as under autarky, but




































Ft represents the latent return to the ￿rst unit of foreign capital in an open economy.
In addition to the variables that mattered under autarky, also land a⁄ects returns to capital
in an open economy. More land will employ more labour in agriculture and leave fewer workers in
manufacturing, resulting in a lower marginal productivity for capital.
If domestic returns to foreign capital are su¢ ciently high to satisfy e rO
Ft > r￿
t, there exists a
stock of foreign capital, KO
Ft, that makes domestic returns to capital equal to the world interest
rate, i.e. rO
Ft = r￿
t. Using equations (24) together with Lemma 3, we can deduce the following:
Lemma 5 If returns to foreign capital are su¢ ciently high so that e rO
Ft > r￿
t holds, the equilibrium






































The in￿ow of foreign capital is thus encouraged by stronger property rights and scarcity of domestic
capital.
Note that if e rO
Ft ￿ r￿
t, returns are evaluated by replacing KFt = 0 in the respective factor
returns in Lemma 3.
20 Note also that we implicitly need to impose parameter restrictions such that rXt will always be greater than
zero.
17It is instructive to note that e rO
Ft is increasing in property rights. Although stronger property
rights increase the demand for labour in the economy, they also increase returns to manufacturing
and the latter e⁄ect always dominates. Therefore, the likelihood of an in￿ ow of capital increases
with the level of property rights. It is also the case that the larger the domestic capital stock, the
less likely it is to attract foreign capital. And, ￿nally, the likelihood of a positive capital in￿ ow
increases in the labour endowment of the country but decreases in the land endowment. The latter
e⁄ect is due to the fact that the agricultural sector will compete more for the labour if the land
endowment is large.
An interesting result for the return to land is that it is now independent of all factor endowments.
This is because (i) goods prices are ￿xed so labour does not move between sectors, and (ii) foreign
capital ￿ ows in at rates yielding a ￿xed return to domestic capital. This means that not only
capital, but also land, has ￿xed returns when capital is ￿ owing freely.
5 Political Economy
Having identi￿ed the economic equilibrium of the model for given trade policies and level of property
rights, we next add a political layer and endogenise economic policy.
In what follows we will consider two economies. One where the political elite consists of the
country￿ s capital owners. In this economy, the ruling autocrat￿ s preferences coincide with those of
a representative capitalist. We refer to this economy as a capital autocracy. In the second type of
economy, the political elite are the country￿ s landlords. In analogy to the capital autocracy, the
autocrat in this economy, in what follows referred to as a land autocracy, caters to the wishes of
the landowners and their preferences coincide.21
Since capital and land endowments are given, we know from (4), (5), (7) and (11) that regimes
regarding trade and property rights a⁄ect the objective of the ruling autocrat by changing the
returns to capital and land. Since returns to capital are what governs the income of the capitalists in
each economy and therefore bequests and aggregate saving, understanding how these regimes a⁄ect
returns is key to understanding aggregate saving, capital accumulation, growth in manufacturing
output and therefore the overall development of income and living standards in the two economies.
Below, we examine the implications of our model for the choices of autocrats and derive con-
ditions for when each regime and policy will be chosen. We start by studying when each autocrat
21 Alternatively we could assume that the autocrat is randomly drawn from the group of elites.
18would choose to open up to trade in Section 5.1, proceed by deriving the optimal level of property
rights in closed and open economies in Section 5.2 and study the autocrats￿incentives to allow for
the in￿ ow of foreign capital in Section 5.3.
5.1 Trade Liberalisation
We start with the ￿rst stage of the model, where the ruling autocrat decides whether or not to
open the economy to international trade. This sets up the baseline scenario on which decision on
property rights protection is based. We assume an initial situation with no foreign capital so that
KFt = 0, yielding AKt = e AKt = 1.
Without foreign capital, a capital owner would prefer free trade if rO
Dt > rC
Dt. Using Lemmas 1











The result allows us to draw some important conclusions. First, the productivity of capital in the
manufacturing sector determines a capitalist￿ s willingness to engage in trade. Stronger property
rights make ￿rms more competitive. In addition, the relative abundance of domestic capital in the
economy shifts the interests of a capitalist autocrat towards free trade for reasons of comparative




increases the willingness of capitalists to engage in trade. Third, more land in the economy increases
the autarky price of manufacturing goods and lowers a capitalist￿ s bene￿ts from trade. Note also
that the population size of a country does not a⁄ect the decision on trade.
For a land owner, the condition instead is rO
Xt > rC


























Condition (28) suggests that a land autocrat is more inclined to trade when (i) productivity
in manufacturing is low (as captured by property rights); (ii) when relative world prices of agri-
cultural goods, P￿
At, are high; (iii) the country is relatively well endowed with land (for reasons of
comparative advantage).
We may formulate the following proposition.
19Proposition 1 Given an initially low level of property rights protection ￿0, a country with a com-
parative disadvantage in manufacturing (low KDt
Xt , high P￿
At) opens to trade if ruled by a land
autocrat, and remains closed under a capital autocrat.
5.2 Property Rights
This section deals with how the ruling autocrat sets property rights for a given trade regime. The
autocrat seeks to maximise his utility, taking into account how households and ￿rms would react.
Looking at factor returns under the di⁄erent regimes in Lemmas 1 and 3, we note that a capital









This is because property rights raise the marginal productivity of capital. As for returns to land,
given Proposition 1, a land autocrat in an open economy with the relative price of goods ￿xed at





Property rights in this case lower the marginal productivity of labour in manufacturing and leaves
more workers in the agricultural sector. In a closed economy, however, a land autocrat still favours





Interestingly, it appears as if globalisation changes the incentives of the land autocrat in a way
which is not bene￿cial for industrial growth.
Proposition 2 A capital autocrat always seeks to strengthen property rights regardless of whether






@￿t > 0). A landed autocrat chooses to enforce
property rights in a closed economy (
@rC
Xt





5.3 Capital Market Liberalisation
We now turn to the autocrat￿ s incentives to allow for the in￿ ow of foreign capital. On the entry
of foreign capital, what matters is not only whether the autocrat allows for capital in￿ ows or not,
20but also whether returns are such that the country is able to attract foreign capital. It is clear from





A look back at Lemma (1) on the other hand shows that a capital autocracy would only be in favor
of capital in￿ ow if gains from productivity spillovers outweigh losses from the direct reduction in




















We therefore focus on the attractiveness of capital to study the moment when capital may enter
in our small developing economy given the trade and property right policies enforced by the ruling
elite.22























where ￿ = 1￿￿
1￿￿￿(1￿￿), as the relative latent return to foreign capital in an open vis-a-vis a closed
economy. Recalling that in an open and closed economy, respectively, e rO
Ft > r￿
t and e rC
Ft > r￿
t must
hold for a positive in￿ ow of foreign capital to occur, we can deduce from the FOC of ~ R with respect
￿t and KDt that:
Proposition 3 A small open economy is more likely to attract foreign capital than a closed one
when property rights are su¢ ciently strong (since @ ~ R
@￿t > 0) and/or when the capital-to-land ratio is
su¢ ciently high (since @ ~ R
@KDt > 0).
A higher value of ~ R makes it more likely for e rO
Ft than e rC
Ft to surpass the world capital rate of
return, r￿
t. Stronger property rights make inward capital ￿ ows more likely in an open economy
because the foreign capital lowers the marginal product of capital while leaving relative prices
intact. The role played by domestic capital can be explained by bequests (note that the e⁄ect
disappears if ￿ = 1). In a closed economy, foreign capital will lead to bequests playing a smaller
role and therefore also lower relative demand, and the price, for manufacturing goods. Finally,
the role of land is due to the fact that when prices are ￿xed outside the country, the factors are
22 For a thorough analysis of the endogenous interest of the ruling elite towards inward foreign direct investment
see Albornoz et al. (2008).
21competing for domestic labour, while this not the case in autarky due to the balancing e⁄ect of
relative prices.
These results suggest that trade in goods and factor mobility are complements for a developing
economy. This is because an improvement in institutions and the accumulation of capital make it
more likely for a small developing economy to both open to trade and liberalise capital markets.
These ￿ndings are in line with Antras and Caballero (2009) in the sense that in a less ￿nancially
developed economy, trade and capital mobility are complements. In his model, trade integration
increases returns to capital and makes the country more attractive to foreign investors.23
6 Simulations
We next turn to numerical simulations aimed at illustrating key mechanisms in the model. The
objective of this section is to study how the chosen property rights regime a⁄ects the elites￿decision
to open up to trade and potentially allow for the in￿ ow of capital. Ultimately, we are interested
in dynamic insights that cannot be immediately deduced from the propositions and lemmas in the
analytical part.
We continue to consider two economies that are identical in terms of initial conditions and di⁄er
only with respect to the nature of the political elite and therefore with respect to the objective
function of the ruling autocrat.
We start by simulating the benchmark model in Section 6.2, and then study the e⁄ects of
negative price shock in terms of a sudden drop in the world-market relative price of agricultural
goods in Section 6.3.
6.1 Parameters
As explained in the theory section, we make the simplifying assumption that land￿ s share in agri-
cultural production, ￿; is equally large as capital￿ s share in manufacturing production. We adopt
the parameterisation of Hansen and Prescott (2002) for the share of land in agricultural production
and set this parameter to :3.24 The weight on agricultural goods in the consumption aggregate, ￿,
is set to :20: The capitalist￿ s weight on consumption is set to :65, implying that they bequeath 35
23 See also Jones and Neary (1984), Markusen (1983), Markusen and Svensson (1985), Neary (1995), and Wong
(1986) on the substitutability or complementarity of trade in goods and factors.
24 The setup of Hansen and Prescott (2002) di⁄ers somewhat from ours as they allow for a capital input also in
the agricultural sector. Moreover, they set the capital share in manufacturing to .4 and the land share in agriculture
to .3.















Figure 3: The optimal level of property rights in the two autocracies.
percent of their lifetime income to their children.
The population is normalised to one and we set the labour force, L, to :8. In each economy, the
share of landowners, NX, is set to :05.25 The residual share of the population, i.e. the remaining
15 percent, constitute the capitalists, NK, in each economy. Each worker is endowed with one unit
of time and each landowner is endowed with one unit of land. The initial capital endowment, k1;
is set to :1.
In order to match actual historical events, we want to start from a situation where the land
autocracy is open to trade while the capital autocracy is initially closed. To this end, we set the
world relative price of agricultural goods, P￿
A; such that it is higher than the autarky relative price
of agricultural goods that would prevail in any of the two economies. P￿
A is thus set to 1:5. The
world market interest rate, r￿, is set to 3.
We think of property rights as a continuous variable, de￿ned on the interval ￿t = [￿;￿] 8t. Both
economies start out at the lower bound for property rights, i.e ￿i
1 = 1 for i = K;X. We assume
that policies are sluggish so that j￿t ￿ ￿t￿1j ￿ k where k is the maximum distance that property
25 The size of the landed class is consistent with historical ￿gures for Latin America, see Larsson and Parente
(2010) for a discussion.










Figure 4: The evolution of capital endowments in the two regimes.
rights can be changed each period.
We assume that the in￿ ow of foreign, more productive capital generates spillovers to domestic
capital according to a linear function: AK = ￿ + ￿KF: We set ￿ to one so that the relative
productivity of capital is normalised to one in the absence of foreign capital. We have no prior for
how to set ￿ but in the benchmark experiments discussed below we let ￿ = 10:
6.2 The Benchmark Model
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium property rights￿regime implemented by the autocrat in each
of the two economies. Recall that for this parameterisation, the land autocracy starts out open
while the capital autocracy starts out closed to world trade. Consistent with Proposition 2, Figure
3 con￿rms that the autocrat in the land autocracy sets property rights at the lower bound in all
periods while the autocrat in the capital autocracy keeps increasing property rights in each period.
To understand how the property rights regime a⁄ects the equilibrium outcome, we need to study
the evolution of the capital endowment of a representative capitalist in each autocracy. Since the
capitalists constitute the only population subgroup that a⁄ects the magnitude of the endowments




















Figure 5: The equilibrium relative price and the (counterfactual) autarky price in the two autoc-
racies.
of the next generation, the capitalists￿endowments are key to understanding the overall equilibrium
dynamics. Figure 4 displays the capital endowments implied by the implemented property rights
regime in each economy. The graph illustrates how the reinforcement of property rights in the
capital autocracy helps boost returns to domestic capital, the income of the capitalists, bequests
and thereby the endowment of future generations. In the land autocracy, the weak property rights
cause a rapid decline in returns to capital, capital income and bequests and lead to stagnation over
the long term.
Turning to the decision to open up to trade in the capital autocracy, Figure 5 illustrates the
equilibrium relative price, PAt; in the two autocracies, along with the counterfactual price that
would prevail in autarky (with and without capital in￿ ow). The top panel shows how in the land
autocracy, the equilibrium price is the world market price in all periods as the economy remains
open for the duration of the experiment. The ￿gure suggests that, in the absence of foreign capital,
the autarky price would decrease as a consequence of the declining capital stock. However, if the
land autocracy were to close to trade but allow for capital in￿ ow, the relative price of agriculture







The relocation of labour





Figure 6: The relocation of labour in the two autocracies.
would increase somewhat initially, but never reach the price level prevailing in the world market.
This graph thus illustrates how, due to the low property rights induced by the open regime and
the small capital stock that follows, the landed autocrat will never choose to close his economy to
trade.
The capital autocracy in the bottom panel starts out in a closed state, but due to the gradual
strengthening of property rights that we saw in Figure 3, the capital stock will grow continuously
as in Figure 4 and eventually cause the autarky price level to rise above the world market price
level. Once the relative price of agricultural goods becomes higher in autarky than in the world
market, the relative price of manufacturing goods by de￿nition becomes higher in the world market
than domestically. This implies that the capitalist elites, who hold the stakes in manufacturing
production choose to open to trade at this point. The capital autocracy thus opens to trade in
period 4 and we see that in Figure 5, the equilibrium price is given by the world market price from
this period onwards.
Consistent with the evolution of capital and prices in the two economies, the allocation of labour
between the two sectors is going to di⁄er across the two autocracies. As displayed in the top panel
26Table 1: Regime choices and the evolution of the capital stock.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Land autocracy
￿ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
KD .015 .004 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
KF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Trade No No No No No No No No No No
F Capital No No No No No No No No No No
Capital autocracy
￿ 1 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5
KD .015 .022 .037 .058 .086 .124 .165 .208 .251 .298
KF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .015 .013 .011
Trade No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Capital No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
in Figure 6, there is a slight increase in labour employed in agriculture mirrored by a decrease in
labour employed in manufacturing in the land autocracy. This follows from the overall decrease in
capital in the economy, in turn leading to stagnation in the production of manufactures. In the
capital autocracy, the image is reversed. As long as the economy remains closed, through periods
1-3, the share of labour in each sector remains constant. However, when the economy opens up, the
increasingly stronger property rights and the accumulation of capital leads to an in￿ ow of workers
from agriculture to manufacturing.26
We next address whether the two economies will liberalise capital markets and allow for an
in￿ ow of foreign capital. Table 1 displays the equilibrium property rights regime along with the
equilibrium levels of domestic capital, KD; the in￿ ow of foreign capital, KF and indications of
whether the economies are open or closed and allow for capital in￿ ow in each period. The results
suggest that while the land autocracy remains open to trade throughout the experiment, the landed
autocrat will never choose to allow for capital in￿ ow. In the capital autocracy, however, the
26 This feature of the model is consistent with Young (1995), who stresses how growth in the East Asian economies
were spurred by rapid growth in investment rates and a large intersectoral transfer of labor into manufacturing.












The evolution of capital
Land Autocracy
Capital Autocracy
Figure 7: The evolution of e⁄ective (aggregate) capital in the two autocracies.
ruling autocrat allows for capital in￿ ows once property rights are su¢ ciently strong, which for this
parameterisation occurs in period 8.27
The evolution of the e⁄ective (aggregate) capital stocks, i.e. AKKD+KF, in the two economies
are plotted in Figure 7. Consistent with the declining capital endowments in Figure 4, the graph
illustrates how the land autocracy stagnates over time. By contrast, spurred by the enforcement of
strong property rights, the capital autocracy grows steadily over time. For the ￿rst seven periods,
the plot of the capital stock looks somewhat convex. This is due to the initial growth being
slightly lower than the capital growth that follows upon globalisation in period 4. Perhaps the
most interesting feature of Figure 7, however, is the sharp increase in capital growth that follows
once the autocrat allows for capital in￿ ow. The entry of more productive, foreign capital boosts
the e¢ ciency of the aggregate capital stock. This acceleration in e⁄ective capital paves the wave
for growth and development in the capital autocracy.




t must hold for investment to be attractive and since
e r
O
Ft is a decreasing function of domestic capital, foreign capital will only ￿ ow to the country if property rights grow
su¢ ciently quickly relative to the decline in e r
O
Ft: Moreover, spillovers from foreign capital need to be su¢ ciently large
for the elite to allow for FDI.












The evolution of capital
Land Autocracy
Capital Autocracy
Figure 8: The evolution of e⁄ective (aggregate) capital in the two autocracies when the world
market price drops from 1:5 to :25 in period 6.
6.3 The E⁄ects of a Price Shock
To illustrate the e⁄ects of a price shock similar to that which hit Latin America after The Great
Depression, we next study the case when the world-market price suddenly drops in period 6. The
decrease in prices will imply that the landed autocrat will want to close the economy to trade. To
this end, we assume that P￿




1:5 8t < 6
:25 8t ￿ 6
As before, the land autocracy starts out open, while the capital autocracy does not open to trade
until it has accumulated su¢ ciently strong property rights, i.e. in period 4. When the price suddenly
drops in period 6, the capital autocracy remains open and is una⁄ected by the price change. The
autocrat in the land autocracy, however, decides to close the economy to trade when the world-
market price falls. The reason is that the autarky price of agricultural goods starts to exceed the
world-market price, implying that the landed elites are better o⁄in a closed environment. Once the
economy is closed, it is optimal for the autocrat to start enforcing property rights as this increases
the relative price of agricultural goods. The gradual strengthening of property rights encourages
capital accumulation and the in￿ ow of more productive foreign capital. The evolution of e⁄ective
29capital in the two autocracies is displayed in Figure 8. We see that while the capital stock in the
capital autocracy remains intact, the world-market price drop in period 6 leads to a sharp increase
in the capital stock in the land autocracy. Due to path-dependence, the land autocracy never
catches up to the capital autocracy in terms of levels or growth rates, but the divergence between
the two countries is much less pronounced.
7 Discussion
In this paper, we use a political economy approach to analyse a small open economy that starts out
with a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing due to an initially small endowment of capital
relative to the rest of the world. We want to study how an autocrat that caters to a political elite,
endowed with either capital or land, values the enforcement of property rights, globalisation and
the liberalisation of capital markets. We show how a stark contrast in the stance of the two types
of autocrats on trade policy separates the development paths of the two regions.
A landed autocrat recognises the higher world market price of agricultural goods with respect to
their autarky price and opens to trade. This increases the returns to domestic landowners and causes
a shift of labour from the manufacturing to the agricultural sector. Since agricultural prices are ￿xed
at the international level in an open economy, the productivity of land will solely be determined
by the number of workers employed in the agricultural sector, which in turn governs the landed
autocrat￿ s policy towards property rights. Since the productivity of land is increasing in the number
of workers per unit of land, the autocrat seeks to prevent a reallocation of workers to manufacturing
by impeding the enhancement of institutions protecting property rights. Globalisation therefore
fails to provide an environment that induces the autocrat to enforce property rights, and may thus
be detrimental to capital accumulation and growth in a land autocracy.
Turning to the liberalisation of capital markets, the landed autocrat would lose from the in￿ ow
of foreign capital, since a larger capital stock will raise the productivity of workers employed in
manufacturing and draw workers out of agriculture. Even if foreign capital were to be allowed into
the country, weak institutional quality would deter foreign investors. Taken together, the policies
implemented in the land autocracy decreases returns to domestic capital through three channels:
(i) opening up to trade lowers the relative price of manufacturing goods; (ii) poor property rights
lower the productivity of capital; and (iii) the inability to attract foreign capital fail to generate
productivity spillovers that, if su¢ ciently strong, could increase the productivity of capital. These
30low returns to capital decrease the incomes of capitalists and cause them to bequeath less, thereby
hampering capital accumulation and development.
The land autocracy can therefore be characterised by early globalisation, weak property rights,
little or no foreign investment and slow capital and income per capita growth. Although we do not
explicitly address import substitution in the model, we use a numerical exercise to replicate the
future impact of shocks that hit Latin America with a sharp exogenous decline in the terms of trade
in 1929-1933 (Taylor, 1998). This exercise, discussed in detail in Section 6.3 above, illustrates how
a shift to the import-competing activity that followed the resulting drop in trade volumes a⁄ected
Latin America￿ s ability to catch up with faster growing regions.
Conversely, the leader in the capital autocracy chooses to sustain a closed economy since the
autarky price of manufacturing goods in a capital scarce country is higher than the world market
price. In contrast to landlords, capital owners bene￿t from strong property rights because this
increases the productivity of the factor they own. The capitalist autocrat therefore enforces property
rights, which in turn increases the returns to capital in a closed economy. As income and bequests
increase, capital accumulation accelerates. Capital owners are more likely to switch stance on trade
if (i) property rights are strongly enforced (since this increases the marginal productivity of capital
and lowers the autarky price of manufacturing goods); and (ii) if the domestic capital stock becomes
su¢ ciently large (since this increases manufacturing output and lowers its autarky price). Thus
when property rights become su¢ ciently strong and the economy accumulates enough capital, the
capitalist autocrat opens up the economy.
If the capitalist autocrat were to maintain autarky, prices would continue to fall. However, in a
trading economy, the fact that prices are ￿xed to the world price results in sustained high returns to
capital and therefore larger bequests and faster capital growth. In such an economy, we show that
trade in goods and factors are complements. This obtains since the strong property rights increase
the rate of returns to capital in the domestic market, thereby attracting international investors.
Strong property rights along with the productivity spillovers from foreign capital work as a catalyst
for growth in the capital autocracy.28
28 This feature of the model is consistent with Hsieh (2002), who shows how technological spillovers from the in￿ ow
of foreign capital can prevent a fall in the returns to capital and trigger further investment in the economy.
318 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we present a dynamic speci￿c-factors model of an economy that may or may not
choose to open up to trade. We use the model to explain key observations on the diverging growth
performances of two regions with a long history of autocratic rule: East Asia and Latin America.
We argue that the preferences of the ruling autocrat can have a crucial e⁄ect on the economy￿ s
development and growth prospects. We show that the incumbent autocrat, by deciding whether or
not to enforce property rights, can set o⁄ a chain of events that have far-reaching implications in
terms of long term growth and living standards.
Our model is consistent with a number of stylised facts that may help us understand the
unprecedented success of East Asia and the mediocre performance of Latin America. The model
suggests that the economies of Latin America were open to trade at an early stage of development
due to their comparative advantage in agricultural products. Trade was endorsed by the landed
political elite who owned the factor of production speci￿c to the agricultural sector. However, in
this open economy, policy makers had weak incentives to enforce strong property rights and the
region failed to attract productive, foreign capital.
In East Asia, the political elite were more capitalist in nature. The East Asian autocrats
were therefore reluctant to open up to trade initially, as they held a comparative disadvantage in
manufacturing and wanted to wait until prices were lower than in world markets. In this state
of autarky, however, the autocrats continued to comply with the demands of the elite and kept
strengthening property rights within the country. Strengthened by sound property rights, the
manufacturing industry grew domestically, and once the region had accumulated a comparative
advantage in manufacturing it became optimal for policy makers to open up to trade. Moreover,
the strong property rights led to the in￿ ow of productive foreign capital that helped boost growth
and development in the region.
Throughout the paper we model pure autocracies which implies that policy makers can imple-
ment whatever policies they choose in the absence of the accountability implied by a democratic
system. However, our results would also obtain in a democracy where vested interest groups con-
sisting of the political elites could tilt policy in their favour by lobbying their preferred policies.
The model can be extended in several interesting dimensions. One weakness of the model
is admittedly the stylised way in which we model property rights. It would be interesting to
study the foundations of property rights in greater detail and to add microfoundations for ￿rms￿
32incentives to invest in new technology. This would, however, complicate the model signi￿cantly
and would most likely require simpli￿cations along some other dimension. Another interesting
possibility would be to introduce a number of explicit trade policies and let the ruling autocrat
set tari⁄s. In such a setting, import substitution could be incorporated in a realistic fashion which
would allow us to address also this phase in Latin American history. Finally, historical experiences
suggest that precautionary savings may have contributed to high saving in East Asia. The idea
here is that East Asia￿ s history of wars and unrest have led its citizens to save in a precautionary
manner. Incorporating such cultural di⁄erences in a dynamic model of growth and development
could therefore also prove an interesting avenue for future research.
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